The purpose of this study is to provide an empirical analysis of the relationship between ownership structure of French firms and their value. Using data for 510 French publicly traded firms, the current study provides evidence in support of the entrenchment hypothesis. The results show that large controlling shareholders maintaining grip on control while holding only a small fraction of cash flow rights are inclined to expropriate minority shareholders, which in turn detrimentally affects the firm's valuation. The evidence also indicates that pyramiding is the main device set to unduly entrench the large controlling shareholder. Additional analysis reveals that, irrespective of its type, sharing control with a family constrains the largest controlling shareholder to steer clear of self-serving behavior whereas a widely held firm or a financial institution, as a second largest controlling shareholder, tend to collude.
Introduction
The corporate finance literature was wont to focus on mitigating the conflict between hired managers who are unaccountable to outsiders and dispersed shareholders due to the separation of ownership and control. Recent studies sharply contrast with Berle and Means' (1932) model of widely diffused corporate ownership and suggest that the presence of controlling shareholders is widespread throughout the world, even in developed countries including the United States (see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny. (1997) , Holderness et al.(1999) , La Porta et al. (1999) ). Indeed, Holderness et al. (1999) documented a higher managerial ownership for US listed firms nowadays than earlier in the century when the Berle and Means study was undertaken.
1 La Porta et al. (1999) studied the ownership structure of large corporations in 27 wealthy countries and found that 64% (76%) of these corporations feature a controlling shareholder at a 20% cut-off point (10% cut-off point). In a similar study on 9 East Asian countries, Claessens et al (2000) document that almost 68% of the firms are controlled by a single shareholder and that the separation of management from ownership control is rare.
In European countries, corporations exhibit a large controlling shareholder who owns voting rights in excess of his cash flow rights and who hires and closely monitors corporate managers (Barca and Becht (2001) ). Faccio and Lang (2002) carried out a study of the ownership and control for 5,232 corporations in 13 Western European countries and found that 63% of the firms have an ultimate controlling shareholder who often owns much more voting rights than cash flow rights.
The evidence, therefore, indicates that in continental Europe, the relevant issue shifted from the traditional agency conflict between professional managers and atomistic shareholders to an equally salient agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. The need to focus on such a conflict has become more acute, all the more so that it was one of the causes of the 1997-1998 East Asian financial crisis and aftermath.
The issue of the divergence between ownership and control, as one of the major causes of minority expropriation, has been shrugged off until recently. Since little has been done on the topic, our understanding is limited and general conclusions cannot be drawn. Our study is carried out on a sample of 510 French publicly traded firms. France is characterized by poor investors' protection rules, by an inefficient law enforcement system, and is deemed to furnish a favorable context to minority expropriation (LaPorta et al. (1999) ). We investigate the valuation effects of the ownership and control structures effectively adopted. In fact, despite the legal and the institutional environment (see Appendix II for a brief overview of shareholders' rights in France), corporations might commit not to expropriate minority shareholders by privileging some ownership and control patterns, thus being less discounted than others are.
The objectives of the current study are manifold. On the one hand, we give a brief overview of the ownership and voting structure of the French listed firms, and to test the presence of large controlling shareholders and ownership-control discrepancy effects on the firm's value. On the other hand, we investigate the relationship between various ownership-control characteristics (presence of pyramids, large shareholder's type…) on the firm's value.
The present study provides evidence in support of the entrenchment hypothesis. Large controlling shareholders maintaining grip on control while holding only a small fraction of cash flow rights are inclined to expropriate minority shareholders, which in turn detrimentally affects the firm's value. The evidence also indicates that pyramiding is the main device set to unduly entrench the large controlling shareholder. Additional analysis reveals that, irrespective of the nature of the largest controlling shareholder, the second largest shareholder plays a monitoring role if he happened to be a family and colludes with the large shareholder otherwise.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: section2 reviews the literature regarding the presence of the large controlling shareholder, the discrepancy between ownership and control, and the mechanisms used to maintain control. The same section presents the pros and cons of the involvement of the large controlling shareholder in the management and discusses the outcome of a multiple controlling shareholders' situation.
Data selection, construction and methodology are described in the third section. The descriptive and multivariate results are portrayed in the penultimate section. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Large controlling shareholder and firm value: Theoretical framework and hypotheses

The Presence of large controlling shareholders
Despite the substantial literature concerning the effect of large controlling shareholder or control concentration on firm value, there are no clear-cut findings yet.
The presence of controlling shareholders with larger claims on the firm's cash flow rights might alleviate the free-riding problem in monitoring the management and thereby mitigates agency costs by aligning their interests with those of the outside shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny (1986) ). Such shareholders are more prone to incur the monitoring costs -e.g. collecting and processing information-and to reap benefits commensurately with their ownership. According to Burkart et al. (1997) , the reduction of managerial discretion by monitoring is not exclusively beneficial. Its value-enhancing effect may be offset by the loss of managerial incentives. Besides keeping tabs on the management team, high stake shareholders may challenge outside raiders, which buoys up shares and hence boosts the takeover premium (Burkart 1995) 2 ; and, if necessary, they oust the managers through a proxy fight or a takeover (Shleifer and Vishny (1986) ). Along these lines, Grossman and Hart (1980) persuasively argue that share concentration is essential for the effectiveness of takeovers.
The above-mentioned arguments suggest that large controlling shareholders may indubitably be costless to minority shareholders. There are however countervailing arguments. Bolton and von Thadden (1998) argue that the main drawback of maintaining a controlling block is that it lowers the stock's liquidity, increasing thus, the firm cost of capital by foregoing the liquidity premium 3 . This liquidity reduction might also cut back the informational content of stock prices (Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) ) and aggravate the free-rider problem without eliminating the large shareholder's rents (Maug (1998) ). Himmelberg et al. (2002) contend that insiders with significant holdings are subject to high levels of idiosyncratic risk, which, increases the risk premium and, therefore, the marginal cost of capital. Stulz (1988) argues that greater manager's holdings consolidate the power of the internal constituency vis-à-vis of the external constituency in influencing the firm's performance. Agency costs arise when the interests of the firm's managers are not in line with those of the firm's owners, and take the form of preference for on-the-job perks, shirking, and making self-serving decisions that reduce shareholder's wealth.
Overall, previous studies suggest that both costs and benefits are associated with large controlling shareholders. The actual effect on the firm's value is the result of weighing the pros and the cons of such presence. This constitutes an empirical issue.
Ownership-control discrepancy: Devices, beneficial and harmful
effects Bebchuk (1999) shows that the presence of large controlling shareholders is inclined to exist along with a separation of cash flow rights and voting rights. Such separation has the potential to create sizeable agency costs and may be a backlash against minority protection, especially when there is an overlapping of ownership and management. This structure is prevailing in many East Asian countries (Claessens et al. (2000) ) and in continental European countries (Faccio and Lang (2002) ) where families usually own several firms through complex ownership structure. France is typical in this respect. La Porta et al. (1998) provide evidence that countries whose legal rules originate in civillaw tradition-as France-have a low quality of law enforcement and tend to poorly protect minority shareholders. In such countries, divergence between control rights and cash flow rights constitute a rule rather than an exception. Grossman and Hart (1988) demonstrate that the deviation from the one-share-one-vote rule maximizes the benefit of control to the controlling party relative to security holders and thus might not be socially optimal. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) explained the negative relation between ownership and firm value-in the 5%-25% ownership range -as an entrenchment effect due to the quasi-entire control of the firm with only a small fraction of cash flow rights. In this range, controlling shareholders are willing to extract private benefits at minority's expense. Bebchuk (1999) and Bebchuk et al (2000) contend that some ownership patterns -i.e. pyramiding, cross-holdings and dual class sharesmight exacerbate the extent of private rents ripped off by favoring some egregious forms of controlling shareholder misbehavior. These potentially large agency costs caused by the severe wedge between ownership and control are only partly internalized by the controlling shareholder proportionally to his cash flow claims while he captures the most part of the diverted funds. Bebchuk et al. (2000) demonstrate that holding controlling stake constant, the agency costs' size is shown to raise nonlinearly in a sharply increasing rate as the fraction of cash flow claims held by the largest controlling shareholder dwindles down.
Beneficial and harmful effects of ownership-control discrepancy
As suggested in recent literature (see, e.g., Wolfenzon (1999) ), controlling shareholders resort to complex and often inefficient schemes so as to dodge minority protection legal rights, to circumvent various enforcement devices or to deceive outside shareholders 4 . In a few circumstances, the gap between ownership rights and control rights could be beneficial to all shareholders. Grossman and Hart (1988) argue that in the case of a proxy fight and in the presence of private benefits both on the incumbent side and on the raider side, a deviation from one-share-one-vote might extract more surpluses from such private benefits and hence be optimal Empirically, La Porta et al. (1998) evidenced that civil law countries do poorly protect minority shareholders. In such environments, it is easier and less costly for the entrepreneur to setup ownership structures facilitating fund diversion. Claessens and al. (2002) showed that East Asian firms featuring ownership-control wedge are traded at a discount that is positively related to the magnitude of such discrepancy. Theses arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
H1: The higher the firm's ownership-control discrepancy the lower the firm's value.
Control devices
The devices enabling a shareholder to control a firm while retaining only a small fraction of the cash flow claims are chiefly stock pyramids, dual-class share structures and crossholdings. Bebchuk et al. (2000) demonstrate that for any desired ownership-vote discrepancy level, however its extent, one of the above devices may allow a shareholder to make a locus of control without owning more than a predefined fraction of cash flow rights. This discrepancy level may be achieved also by combining two or more mechanisms.
Among these mechanisms, pyramiding is the most frequently used device to maintain grip on control while owning only a tiny proportion of the equity claims (La Porta et al. (1999) ). Pyramiding allows the overarching family or the parent company to control a range of affiliated firms via several layers of intermediary companies and to interfere in their management. This hazy pattern shackles outside monitoring and ensures to the ultimate owner the imperviousness of minority scrutiny so as to enjoy and to warrant private benefits of control. Another mechanism is cross-holdings. Being horizontally interconnected, cross-holdings firms provide insulation and entrenchment to controlling shareholders. The needed voting rights to maintain a lock on control over an array of firms are, unlike pyramids, distributed among the whole array instead of being the property of a single family or a parent company. This device is commonplace in Singapore, Malaysia and Japan among East Asian countries (Claessens et al. (2000) ). The
European firms, except German corporations, do not exhibit cross-holdings as a device to secure control. In France, despite the plenty of leeway that the law gives to use this kind of arrangement, cross-holdings are seldom used (Faccio et al. (2002) ) 5 .
The use of dual-class shares is generally subject to some restrictions. In many countries, corporate law caps the proportion of low-vote shares and/or restricts the voting ratio between high-and low-vote shares (Bebchuk et al. (2000) ) 6 . French firms are allowed to grant a second vote to faithful shareholders when they hold a registered stock for, at least, a two-years period 7 . These high-voting shares, omitted in previous studies, are not publicly traded on the French Stock Exchange, and are hence closely held. French firms are accustomed to use voting pacts or in-concert actions with preemption right clause to lock out other shareholders from control. Unlike pyramiding and non-traded high voting shares, cross-holdings and non-voting shares are uncommonly used in the French context as alternative devices to separate ownership and control and will consequently be disregarded in the current study 8 .
Finance scholars emphasize the primordial role of minority protection in the development of financial markets and instance several practices of unfair minority expropriation that might flourish especially when there is a divergence between ownership and control. (see, e.g., ). In fact, a controlling shareholder may take advantage of his position to overstaff or to hire in key managerial positions unqualified family members with excessive compensations, to squander firm's funds on value destroying pet projects, to consume perks or even to, simply, abscond with firm's assets outright as through self dealing transactions. Moreover, expropriation can take the form of scheduling dividend payments in accordance with the controlling shareholder's consumption and investment programs, diverting corporate opportunities to closely owned firms, borrowing from the corporation at advantageous conditions, using firm's assets as collateral for personal loans or in other instances investing in high private benefits projects despite their negative net present value. In sum, the corporate decisions might be taken in such a fashion as to be in harmony with the controlling shareholder's idiosyncratic utility, (2000)). From the earlier-mentioned arguments, the following hypothesis might be drawn:
H2: Firms where ownership-control discrepancy is maintained through pyramiding and/or non-traded high voting shares should be associated with lower value.
H3: The firm's value should be lower in firms exhibiting a lock on control through voting pacts or in concert actions.
Identity of the controlling shareholder
It is "common wisdom" among scholars and practitioners in the field of corporate governance that the ownership type matters in explaining firm valuation differences.
Family shareholders try to preserve their reputation for a potential external funding (La ). This reputation may acts as a substitute for weak legal protection and poor enforcement of minority rules (which is rather often the case in the French civil law countries) (Gomes (2000) ). DeAngelos and DeAngelos (1985) argue that familycontrolled firms -characterized by a long run relationship between its members and the firm-have less agency costs due to good monitoring. Further impetus to the monitoring process may come from the family own wealth being closely bonded to the firm's welfare. Moreover, controlling families often purvey a better oversight quality because of their expertise, tenure, longer horizon 910 (Anderson and Reeb (2002) ) and excellent information on the firm (Smith and Amoako-Adu, (1999) ).
Notwithstanding the preceding arguments insinuating that family-controlled companies present many comparative advantages, family control may lead to severe inefficiencies.
For instance, La Porta et al. (1999) argue that families are famed for favoring their own interests by implementing self-serving policies at the expense of outside residual claimants. DeAngelos and DeAngelos (2000) contend that families ensure themselves the loyalty of the management even in the case of no blood or marriage ties. They instance the case of Time Mirror Company where the family desire for special dividends freezes some expansion plans and harms the firm's performance.
Companies controlled by widely held firms or widely held financial institutions may display lesser agency costs than those controlled by families inasmuch as they are managed by professionals continuously subject to a dismissal threat and to a risk of a hostile takeover. On the other hand, some costs may rise when banks are simultaneously controlling shareholders and creditors. These financial institutions are ambivalent about whether to maximize firm value or fees (Boehmer (2000) ). Widely held parent firms have the possibility through various deals to tunnel profits away from the subsidiary (Bertrand et al. (2002) ).
State-controlled firms operate essentially in markets with significant externalities where they may favor social and political goals over profit maximization. These firms are generally privatized to be invigorated and thus may serve as "cash cows" for other activities. The staff of such firms is chosen on the basis of political connections rather than on their competence. Megginson, et al. (1994) , among others, provide evidence that state-controlled firms exhibit higher performance levels than privately owned firms. Faccio and Lang (2002) document in a cross-country study of 13 Western European countries that in more than two-thirds of the family controlled firms, the controlling owner is a member of the top management team 11 . Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the existence of family ties between controlling shareholders and managers should lower the agency costs. The rationale behind their contention is that such owner-manager families are, at the same time, principals and agents. Many empirical studies have brought support to this contention. Daily and Dollinger (1992) evidenced that family-owned andmanaged firms display higher performance due to the unification of ownership and control. Daily and Thompson (1994) found that family-managed firms behave no differently than other professionally managed firms with respect to strategic posture. Anderson and Reeb (2002) show using Standard & Poor's 500 companies that family firms do outperform other non-family firms. Their result is shown to stem mainly from firms in which members of the controlling family belong to the senior management team. Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2002) argue that the desire of family mangers to preserve their reputation gives them incentive to enhance the firm's performance.
Controlling shareholder involvement in the management
The involvement of the controlling shareholder in the firm management, however, may not necessarily be favorable to minority shareholders. The large leeway of the ownermanager over the company's decision may lead to the firm's objectives' subordination to family's objectives, and hence may hamper firm's performance. In a study of Thai firms, Wiwattanakantang (2001) shows that firms in which the controlling shareholders are involved in management exhibit poor accounting performance indicators. Likewise, Maury and Pajuste (2002) found a family member in a CEO position has a negative effect on the firm value.
The above arguments suggest that the large controlling shareholders' involvement in the management generates both costs and benefits. It is thus left as an empirical task to detect the actual sign of its influence on the firm's value.
Multiple controlling shareholders
Shared control constitutes a potential challenge to the incumbent large controlling shareholder who may be constrained by other shareholders not to stray from value maximization. In fact, other firm controllers' may exercise their power by refusing to assent harmful business decisions and even invalidating those taken through bringing derivative suits. Bloch and Hege (2001) argue that control benefits are less important on average when several blockholders are present. In fact, for the purpose of seizing control, the two leading blockholder vie with each other to garner minority votes by committing themselves to cut down rent extraction. The pivotal votes of minority shareholders in control contests force the second largest blockholder to pledge to pursue a more pronounced value-enhancing strategy. Moreover, their model suggests that a decrease in the difference in block size between the leading shareholders heighten control contestability and reduces on average the breadth of control benefits. In the Gomes and
Novaes (2001) model, the requisite unanimity agreement among all the controlling group members on various decisions implies a weak likelihood of rent extraction and entails less expropriation. This bargaining effect in favor of minority shareholders is counterweighted by the internal disagreements, which constitutes a hindrance to adopt all worthful projects. The resolution of this trade-off shows that the net effect of multiple controlling shareholders is contingent on firm characteristics. Bennedson and Wolfenzon (2000) argue that when investor protection is weak, diluting control among numerous controlling shareholders can serve as a commitment device to dampen minority expropriation 12 . Edwards and Weichenrieder (2000) develop and discuss a static model of the relationship between firm value and its ownership and vote characteristics. Their model suggests that the net effect of an incremental holding by the second largest shareholder is advantageous to minority shareholders. The latter take advantage from the presence of this shareholder who monitors both the incumbent management and the largest controlling shareholder rather than colludes with them at the expense of minority shareholders.
Conversely, the presence of multiple large shareholders might not suffice to reduce acting at minority shareholders expense. Zwiebel (1995) assumes in his general equilibrium model that control benefits are apportioned depending upon the relative extent of investors' interest. He suggests that a situation where several blockholders -each of them with insufficient stake to be unchallenged by other investors-is likely to occur. These moderate sized blockholders-under the assumption of divisible control benefits-are prone to take part in controlling coalitions in a manner allowing them to maximize their benefits from partial control. Hence, the impact of such setting on minority shareholders wealth is conditional upon the outcome of the trade-off between large controlling shareholder monitoring and being member of a coalition. Moreover, other controlling shareholders would be more prone to free ride in monitoring efforts (Winton (1993)) 13 and their presence would lower the market liquidity which guarantee an easy exit to them without warranting counteracting benefits in monitoring (Bolton and von Thadden (1998) ).
Empirically, results on the effect of multiple controlling shareholders on firm value are mixed. Ginglinger and L'Her (2000) shareholding. Also, a beneficial effect is detected when the bank is complementing a family or a corporation as the second-or third largest stake.
In their study of the effect of ownership features on dividend policy, Faccio et al. (2001) find evidence that the multiple controlling shareholders collude in expropriating minority shareholders in Eastern Asia, but appear to help containing it in Western Europe. Maury and Pajuste (2002) focus on the interplay between the three largest shareholders using a sample of Finnish listed companies. They provide evidence that a strong third blockholder contributes in lessening expropriation especially in a high control contestability situation where the two other major shareholders hold relatively similar voting stakes. Nevertheless, these two shareholders tend to collude when they jointly hold a majority.
The above-arguments on the presence of multiple controlling shareholders lead to the following hypothesis:
H4: Sharing control should influence positively the firm's value.
Data construction and methodology
Data sources
This study is based on a unique manually gathered database on the ownership and voting Any firm traded on the French stock market with its head office on French territory is included in the sample when it meets the four following criteria. First, the primary industry must not be financial, i.e., not one-digit-SIC (Standard industrial Classification) code of 6 due to their operational and financial specificities. Second, all accounting data used in the analysis must be reported in the Worldscope database. Third, we must have complete ownership and voting information and could trace back the ultimate owner by following the ownership chain. Finally, the firm has to be listed prior to 2000.
Taking into consideration these restrictions, we are left with a sample of 510 companies.
The 2000 year-end market capitalization of the 510 companies in the sample amounts to 91% of the year-end market capitalization of all non-financial companies listed in the French Stock exchange.
Ownership and control variables construction
The database used in the current study overcomes some data shortcomings of previous studies on the French context in the field. It furnishes a more comprehensive description of the ownership and voting structure and of the various devices employed to warrant the excess of control over ownership 17 . The ownership and voting figures collected from the various sources mentioned take into account not only the effect of non-voting shares but also non-traded registered high voting shares. These figures are corrected by taking into consideration the presence of voting caps when used.
In consistency with La Porta et al. (1999) , we meticulously traced the ownership of any firm back to the ultimate owner. Generally, the direct owner of a firm is a financial corporation, a listed or an unlisted firm. We identify the direct owners, the owners of those owners, etc. We stop going back up when we encounter no shareholder in a given layer of the chain with at least 10% control stake or an individual shareholder. Individual owners linked by blood or marriage ties are considered as a unit of analysis since they are likely to act together. The ownership and control right of different family members was aggregated notwithstanding the possibility of sib quarrels concerning control. For many firms, we were able to track down the relationship between controlling shareholders and the management, beyond their surnames.
17 Bloch and Kremp (2001) studied the French top 40 firms ranked by market capitalization. Their data do not represent as argued by Faccio and Lang (2002) neither ultimate ownership nor ultimate control stakes. Faccio and Lang's (2002) do not consider non-traded registered high voting shares -widely used among listed French firms-which sharply understate the ownership-control discrepancy measure (see Hamon (2001) ).
In line with earlier studies, a 10% cut-off level is employed throughout the paper to track down the ultimate owner. We use the 20% cut-off point just to describe ownership and control characteristics of the firms. We document the nature of the ultimate controlling shareholder, the means used to maintain lock on control and we measure the extent ownership-control discrepancy.
A firm is qualified as widely held at a specified threshold if none of its shareholders holds voting stakes exceeding that threshold. We apply the commonly used classification of the ultimate owners into five types: a family, a widely held firm, a widely held financial institution (SIC 6000-6999), the state, or a miscellaneous owner (i.e., a charity, a voting trust, a cooperative, employees,..).
The two following examples of ownership structure are intended to improve the understanding of how French firms are owned. Fig.1 Alliance at a 10% threshold) and confirm the trivial use of the listed non-voting shares (11 firms out of 510 representing 2.15%). Overall, the logit results indicate that the choice ownership-control discrepancy means depends on firm's characteristics and on the identity on the controlling shareholder.
Results and analysis
Descriptive Statistics
4.2.The determinants of ownership-control discrepancy devices:
4.3.Multivariate analysis:
Apart from ownership and voting structure variables, the value of a company is influenced by some of its characteristics. To avoid any spurious relation between corporate value and firm performance, a set of control variables are introduced in the regressions. We rely on previous research in considering the following variables: the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets as a proxy of firm's size, age measured as the number of years since the firm's establishment and leverage measured as the book value of non-equity liabilities over the book value of total assets. Also, we include sales growth proxied by the one-year percentage change in sales and the ratio of capital expenditure (including additions to fixed assets such as property, plant and equipment and investment in machinery and equipment) over book value of total assets as proxies for growth prospects and investment opportunities. Industry dummies were intended to control for a possible industry effect on the valuation variable. We include 11 industry variables throughout the regressions following Campbell's (1996) classification with leisure as the reference industry. All variables used in the current study are presented in Appendix A.
The Presence of the largest controlling shareholder, ownership-vote discrepancy, and firm value:
The main concern of this study is to investigate whether greater concentration of the voting rights in the hands of the controlling owners leads to more entrenchment, and thus increases their incentives and their capacity to extract private benefits. We tried also to inspect if a substantial discrepancy between ownership and control-due to lesser cash flow rights-exacerbates the likelihood for such expropriation. To test the possible existence of these two effects on minority expropriation, we regress the Tobin's Q on the ultimate voting right of the controlling shareholder (LCS vote) and on the separation between his cash flow rights and voting rights (Excess control). The latter variablemeasuring the wedge between ownership and control-is a proxy for the agency problems related to minority expropriation.
The table 4 presents multivariate analysis results of the relationship between the ownership and control of the largest controlling shareholder and firm value with both continuous and dummy variables proxying for the ownership-vote discrepancy. Two dummies are used: discrepancy and high discrepancy to capture a possible nonlinearity in the relationship. The control variables are the above described firm characteristics and industry dummies. Before running any regression, the absence of multicollinearity is checked using variance inflation factors. Besides, we used the White (1980) formulation of a heteroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator that provides correct estimates of the coefficient co-variances in the presence of heteroscedasticity of an unknown form.
In both regression 1 and 3, we see a negative and statistically significant (at 5% level)
relationship between the controlling shareholder voting stakes and firm value. The two coefficients are economically similar. This outcome is not different from that of Cronqvist and Nilsson (2000) who, using Swedish firms' data, find that the voting stakes of the controlling shareholders are negatively associated with Tobin's Q.
In the 2 nd and 3 rd regressions, we find that there is a negative influence of the controlling owner's excess votes on firm valuation. The two coefficients for the discrepancy variable are consistently statistically and economically significant. The magnitude of the discrepancy coefficient (-0.8792) is by far greater than that of the voting stakes (-0.0122) suggesting that investors are more sensitive to the deviation from one-share-one-vote than to the actual level of control maintained by the largest controlling shareholder per se.
In sum, the results support hypothesis 1. This negative effect may also be explained by the fact that firms with greater discrepancy between ownership and control are traded at much greater discount than are other firms. The coefficients of the controlling variables barely change from one regression to another. These results mean that any decision that increases the discrepancy between the ownership and control would have a heavily negative impact on the firm's value. The following decisions amidst others sharpen that discrepancy: granting a second vote to the controlling shareholder, converting non-voting shares into voting shares or even the case of shares buy-back since those repurchased are deprived from voting. Contrariwise, dual class unification when superior vote shareholders give up their superior voting status would positively affect the firm's value.
In the next regression (4), we use a discrepancy dummy, high discrepancy, which takes the value of one if the voting rights (V1) of the largest controlling shareholder are higher than his cash flow rights (C1) and his control excess (V1-C1)/V1 is higher than the median excess (19.1%) in corporations where there is a deviation from the one-shareone-vote rule, and zero otherwise. This variable is significantly negatively related to the firm value (5% threshold). The economic effect of this variable is substantially important (-0.4592) and suggests that firms with great discrepancy level trade at larger discount than others. In an unreported regression, a discrepancy dummy, which takes the value of one if control exceeds votes and zero otherwise was used as the unique ownership variable. Its coefficient was negative but not significant. The non-significance may be due to firms where excess control hardly exists. This situation corresponds generally to one-share-one-vote stand-alone firms having some repurchased shares.
In a specification close to that of Claessens and al. (2002) (regression 5), where two dummies were included (high discrepancy and discrepancy), the coefficient of the later was negative and insignificant while the coefficient of the former was negative and significant at only a 10% level this time.
All firm's characteristic variables but one have significant effect on firm value. The firm's size and age have a negative influence on its valuation indicating that small-sized and younger firms may have more growth perspectives. Sales growth, a proxy for future growth opportunities, positively affects the Tobin's Q, whereas leverage shows a negative influence.
The effect of the presence of large controlling shareholder is assessed in regression 6 through a dummy variable, controlling shareholder. The estimated coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% threshold. This outcome suggests that controlled firms are valued at a discount in comparison with widely held firms. An important caveat on this result that should be interpreted cautiously is the small number of widely held firms in the current sample (28 firms).
The effect of control devices on firm value:
Hitherto the findings do not provide any enlightenment concerning the devices that bring about value discounts. The regressions in Table 5 are aimed to test the effect of control mechanisms' use on the firm's value. Three dummies were created to differentiate between firms implementing a mechanism from others: pyramid 29 , non-traded double voting shares and voting pact or in concert action 30 . Any of these dummies equals one when the firm has implemented the device, and zero otherwise. The voting structure and other firm characteristics are controlled for in the regression.
The rationale underlying these regressions is that minority shareholders anticipate the extent of the expropriation behavior of the ultimate owner using any of the enumerated devices, gauge the likelihood of being trapped and discount the firm's value in consequence. Scarcely used mechanisms -i.e.: voting cap and listed non-voting sharesare left out from the analysis.
The coefficient of pyramiding dummy variable in regression 1 (Table 5 ) is negative and statistically significant at one percent threshold, which indicates that firms appertaining to a pyramid are markedly discounted in comparison with unaffiliated ones. The magnitude of the coefficient (-0.5648) reflects that ceteris paribus a pyramid-affiliated firm is worth less than half of an unaffiliated firm (Hypothesis 2). In the following regression (number 2 in table 5), the non-traded high voting shares dummy's coefficient is negative but insignificant. That is, the evidence does not support the argument that the use of nontraded high voting shares is detrimental to the firm value (Hypothesis 3). In contrast to those two mechanisms, no evidence of the effect on the use of voting pact or in concert action is tracked down. The coefficient of this dummy is insignificantly positive (regression3 in Table 5 ). When combining the three dummies in the same regression, results remain unchanged (regression 4, Table 5 ). In sum, the evidence suggests that the affiliation to pyramids leads to a more entrenched situation. The results concerning the 29 A firm is considered as affiliated to a pyramid when it has an ultimate controlling owner who controls it through another partially owned corporation. 30 We do not distinguish here between voting pact and in concert action. Both non-traded double voting shares dummy and voting pact or in concert action dummy are multiplied by controlling shareholder dummy to consider only the controlled firms.
negative effect of ownership-control discrepancy are therefore driven mainly by pyramiding and to a lesser extent by the use of non-traded high voting shares.
The effect of the large controlling shareholder type and involvement in the management:
In view of the above evidence that support a significant negative effect of ownershipcontrol discrepancy on firm value, we investigate whether the identity of the controlling shareholder matters in explaining differences in corporate valuation. We also test the effect of the ownership-vote discrepancy of each controlling shareholder category on the Tobin's Q. To do so, controlling owners were broken down into three categories: Family, State and widely held firm or widely held financial institution. Specifically, three dummy variables are included in the regression (regression 1, Table 6 ) each of which for one shareholder category. In addition, we combine the three dummy variables representing owner types and the control excess (Family*Excess control, State*Excess control, and WHFFI*Excess control) to take into consideration the effect of the ownership-control discrepancy for each specific owner category. The results displayed in Table 6 are somewhat striking and present evidence that the detrimental effect of the discrepancy is exacerbated when the firm is state-owned or family owned. All the controlling owners category's dummies are statistically insignificant suggesting that the control excess is what matters and not the controlling owner's identity per se.
In regression 2 (Table 6) 
Multiple controlling shareholders:
While the above results support the entrenchment effect of the largest controlling shareholder, especially when there is a discrepancy between ownership and vote stakes, they do not provide any evidence on the effect of a second largest controlling shareholder. Regressions in table 7 try to explore the net effect of a shared control situation (Hypothesis 4). Heretofore, only a few studies have addressed empirically the issue of shared control and to the best of our knowledge, this issue has been ignored in the context of pyramiding. It seems to be no unique voting measure of the second largest shareholder stakes that could be applied to all the situations encountered in our sample.
The use of either the direct voting or the ultimate voting, as measures of weighing the second largest controlling shareholder relative to the largest one is not fully adequate.
This situation will be illustrated through two examples. Suppose that two firms B and C control a firm A with 45% and 35% voting stake respectively, and that another widely held firm D is the unique controlling shareholder at a 10% level of both B and C with a 
Conlusion
Using a sample of 510 French listed firms, this paper addresses the agency conflict between large and minority shareholders. The key findings are that the large controlling shareholder's voting stake per se, and notably along with ownership-control discrepancy, detrimentally affect the firm's value. The magnitude of the discrepancy's negative effect sharply outweighs that of the voting stake size of the large controlling shareholder. These results are in consistence with the entrenchment effect hypothesis. Additional analysis suggests that controlling shareholders resort to -in a decreasing order of prevalence-nontraded voting shares, voting pact or in concerted action and pyramiding to maintain control. Pyramiding and non-traded high voting shares are shown to lead to value discounts. Only the coefficient of the former device is statistically significant. Besides, the findings do not support the contention that the ownership types influence the firm's valuation. In contrast, we find that family-controlled firms and state-owned firms controlled with a wedge between voting and cash flow rights are discounted in comparison with other firms. Regardless of the controlling shareholder's identity; sharing control with a family constrains it to maximize firm's value whereas a widely held firm or a financial institution, as a second largest controlling shareholder encourages collusion.
Although the results documented in this paper plainly scratch the thorny concern of the agency conflicts between a large controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, they might be useful for lawmakers fretful in the protection of small shareholders, in the implementation of corporate governance best practices and in safeguarding trust in financial markets, especially in gloomy periods. The current research might be extended in various directions. The composition of the board of directors and the interlocking directorate within pyramids are worth studying to ferret out the extent of power vested in the ultimate controlling shareholder.
Appendix 1: Minority shareholders rights: The legal framework
In spite of the quasi absence from the firm's life, minority shareholders remain a thorn in the side of the controlling shareholder. The French law 94-679 (August 1994) allows minority shareholders of listed firms to be grouped in associations defending their interests. Generally, any shareholder or duly qualified association of shareholders holding at least 5% of the votes are given several important rights to counter any insiders infringement of minority protection rules (This threshold decreases with the size of the firm capital. It equals 1% when the firm's capital is above 100 millions FRF). They have the possibility of applying to the court to convene a general meeting, to put a matter on the agenda of the meeting, to request -through the court -that a special audit of the management for specific measures be carried out, and to bring an action on liability for damages against the members of the management team. Moreover, when the fault lays with the auditor, minority shareholders have the right to ask for its revocation, through a legal action. With a 10% of the votes, a shareholder has the right to demand a general meeting without court intervention even in no emergency situations, the right to demand the dissolution of the firm from the Commerce Court's president, and the right to require the establishment of consolidated financial statement when all conditions are satisfied.
Irrespective to the number of shares held, a shareholder is allowed to take part in general meetings and to vote either in person, by proxy or by mail, to submit written questions to the board relating to the agenda for the meeting, and to request in the pre-meeting period the consultation of the annual report and the needed documentation to assess the firm's financial situation.
In the presence of a large controlling shareholder, the right of redemption is an important way to ensure minority protection. The squeeze out provisions are triggered when any individual or entity, acting alone or in concert with others, owns directly or indirectly at least 95% of the outstanding shares or voting rights of a listed company in the French market (Law No 89-532 of 2 August 1989). This enables the majority shareholders to redeem at a fair indemnity the shares of the minority. The redemption price should be supervised by the COB (French equivalent of the SEC) which may authorize the recourse to an independent expert (Paris court, 1st chamber, sect. Bourses de valeurs, 18 April 1991). This range of measures in favor of minority shareholders in France does not, however, really reflects their protection level. In fact, it is rare that the court admits the liability of controlling shareholders or directors to indemnify all the harm caused to a minority. Besides, a long period of lawsuit is necessary to quash or to modify an unfair resolution.
In France, the simple majority of the shareholder vote cast is required in all the matters of the ordinary general meetings or concerning a capital increase by incorporation of reserves, profits or share premium at an extraordinary general meeting. This majority should take into account shares that are not entitled to voting rights such as unused or repurchased shares, those held by entities controlled directly or indirectly by that firm, and those beyond voting caps. Ordinary decisions include approving the annual accounts; appointing independent auditors; electing, replacing or removing directors or members of the supervisory board; declaring dividends or authorizing the payment of dividend in shares; and issuing debt securities.
A two third majority of shareholders present or represented may pass any resolution at an extraordinary general meeting. Such resolutions include the amendments of the firms bylaws, the creation of a new class of equity securities, the issuance of non-voting shares, convertible or exchangeable securities, the establishment of any other rights to equity securities, the buy-back of own shares, the merger decisions, the increase or decrease of the share capital, and the voluntary winding up of the firm. Rights of a given class of shareholders can be amended only by action of an extraordinary general meeting of the class of shareholders affected. Two-third of the shares class voting either in person or by mail or proxy must approve any proposal to amend shareholder rights. (1) non-voting traded shares, (2) non-traded double voting shares, (3) pyramiding affiliation, and (4) the existence of a pact or an in concert action between the firm's shareholders. All these variables are dummies. Each of them takes a value of 1 if the device is implemented within the firm. The few number of firms using non-voting traded shares motivates the use of the Rare Event Logit model developed by King and Zeng (2001) in equation 1.The following variables are used as explanatory variables: Tobin's Q defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt all divided by the book value of total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Age is the number of years since establishment. Sales growth is the one-year percentage change in sales. Capex is the ratio of total capital expenditures over book value of total assets. Leverage is the ratio of book value of non-equity liabilities over book value of total assets. Pyramiding A firm is controlled through a pyramid if it has an ultimate owner, who controls it indirectly through another partially held corporation. a, b and c indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. The P-values are computed using the Huber-White-Sandwich robust variance estimator. 
Appendix II: Description of variables used in this study
Table4: Ownership-control discrepancy and firm value
All the regressions are run using an ordinary least squares specification. The dependent variable is the Tobin's Q defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt all divided by the book value of total assets. UV1 is the ultimate voting rights of the largest controlling shareholder. Excess control is the ownership-control discrepancy measure of the largest controlling shareholder. It is measured as the ultimate control rights minus ultimate ownership rights of the largest ultimate controlling owner, all divided by his ultimate control rights. Discrepancy is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the ultimate control rights of the largest controlling shareholder are higher than his ultimate cash flow rights; and 0 otherwise. High discrepancy is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if ultimate control rights (UV1) are higher than ultimate cash flow rights (UC1) and the excess of control (UV1-UC1)/UV1 is higher than the median excess in corporations where there is deviation from the one-share-one-vote. LCS is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is controlled at 10% cut-off point; and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Age is the number of years since establishment. Sales growth is the one-year percentage change in sales. Capex is the ratio of total capital expenditures over book value of total assets. Leverage is the ratio of book value of non-equity liabilities over book value of total assets. Industry dummies following Campbell's (1996) classification are included in the regression but not reported. a, b and c indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. The P-values, based on the White's heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors, are between parentheses beside the estimated coefficients.
Independent Variable Equation 1
Equation 2 Equation 3 Equation 4 Equation 5 Equation 6 All the regressions are run using an ordinary least squares specification. The dependent variable is the Tobin's Q defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt all divided by the book value of total assets. UV1 is the ultimate voting rights of the largest controlling shareholder. Pyramid is a dummy equals 1 if the firm is controlled through a pyramid; 0 otherwise. A firm is controlled through a pyramid if it has an ultimate owner, who controls it indirectly through another partially held corporation. Non-traded double voting shares is a dummy equals 1 if the firm's bylaw authorizes the existence of non-traded double voting shares; 0 otherwise. Voting pact or in concert action is a dummy equals 1 if there is an agreement between the large controlling shareholders (voting pact or in concert action); 0 otherwise. Both non-traded double voting shares and voting pact or in concert action variables are interacted with controlling shareholder variable in order to take into account the only case of controlled firms Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Age is the number of years since establishment. Sales growth is the one-year percentage change in sales. Capex is the ratio of total capital expenditures over book value of total assets. Leverage is the ratio of book value of non-equity liabilities over book value of total assets. Industry dummies following Campbell's (1996) classification are included in the regression but not reported. a, b and c indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. The P-values, based on the White's heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors, are between parentheses beside the estimated coefficients.
Equation 2 All the regressions are run using an ordinary least squares specification. Regression 2 is run on the family firms' sub-sample. The dependent variable is the Tobin's Q defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt all divided by the book value of total assets. UV1 is the ultimate voting rights of the largest controlling shareholder. LCS Family is a dummy equals 1 if the LCS is a family; and 0 otherwise. Excess control is the ownership-control discrepancy measure of the largest controlling shareholder. It is measured as the ultimate control rights minus ultimate ownership rights of the largest ultimate controlling owner, all divided by his ultimate control rights. LCS State is a dummy equals 1 if the LCS is a family; and 0 otherwise. LCS WHFFI is a dummy equals 1 if the LCS is a widely held firm or a widely held financial institution; and 0 otherwise. Family membership is a dummy equals 1 if the LCS (or a member of his family) is present among firm's top management (CEO, Honorary Chairman, Chairman, or ViceChairman); and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Age is the number of years since establishment. Sales growth is the one-year percentage change in sales. Capex is the ratio of total capital expenditures over book value of total assets. Leverage is the ratio of book value of non-equity liabilities over book value of total assets. Industry dummies following Campbell's (1996) classification are included in the regression but not reported. a, b and c indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. The P-values, based on the White's heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors, are between parentheses beside the estimated coefficients. All the regressions are run using an ordinary least squares specification. The dependent variable is the Tobin's Q defined as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt all divided by the book value of total assets. UV1 is the ultimate voting rights of the largest controlling shareholder. Excess control is the ownership-control discrepancy measure of the largest controlling shareholder. It is measured as the ultimate control rights minus ultimate ownership rights of the largest ultimate controlling owner, all divided by his ultimate control rights. Shared control is a dummy equals 1 if the firm has a second shareholder at 10% threshold; and 0 otherwise. LCS Family is a dummy equals 1 if the LCS is a family; and 0 otherwise. 2LCS Family is a dummy equals 1 if the second largest controlling shareholder is a family; and 0 otherwise. 2LCS WHFFI is a dummy equals 1 if the second largest controlling shareholder is a widely held firm or a widely held financial institution; and 0 otherwise. Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Age is the number of years since establishment. Sales growth is the one-year percentage change in sales. Capex is the ratio of total capital expenditures over book value of total assets. Leverage is the ratio of book value of non-equity liabilities over book value of total assets. Industry dummies following Campbell's (1996) classification are included in the regression but not reported. a, b and c indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. The P-values, based on the White's heteroscedasticity-consistent robust standard errors, are between parentheses beside the estimated coefficients. 
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